

Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools  
new threats – new opportunities



## Bio

- 8 years in a security lab
- Technology lover
- Analysis techniques // exploits
- Involved from sample preparation to report writing
  - Optical systems setup
  - Sample preparation
  - Delayering
  - Imagery
  - Software developments





## Bio

- Semi-invasive attacks
- Invasive attacks – circuit edit
- Micro-probing
- Various experiments
  - Photoemission
  - AFM techniques
  - Electrical glitch





## Talk Description

- Focus on Hardware reverse engineering
- Evolution of the all process
  - Sample preparation
  - Imaging
  - Study
- Change in evaluation criterias
- Future evolutions

Talk  
description

context

Future  
developments

HRTs as the  
next step

HRT outcomes



## Context

- Attacks summary
- Chip classification

context

HRTs as the  
next step

HRT outcomes

Future  
developments





## Non invasive attacks - VCC and Clk glitch

- Take advantage of the RTL technology
- Used to skip instructions or to disturb the normal execution

⇒ Finding the glitch pattern is empirical

⇒ The real effect stays hidden

## Context – Attacks summary







Context – Attacks summary

Semi-invasive attacks - Sample preparation techniques

*Partial opening - frontside*







## Context – Attacks summary

### Semi-invasive attacks - Sample preparation techniques

#### *Repackaging*






## Context – Attacks summary

### Semi-invasive attacks - Sample preparation techniques

*In situ:*





## Semi-invasive attacks – Principle

- 1064 nm laser spot can induce transistor switch
- Silicon is « transparent » @1064 nm
- Metal planes prevent laser fault injection
- Fault is injected at a precise given location

## Context – Attacks summary


## Semi-invasive attacks – Tests

### *Fishing :*

- . Unknown timing
- . Vague localization
- . Trial and Error

=> Working ;-)

## Context – Attacks summary








## Semi-invasive attacks – Tests

*Automated fishing (a first step toward laser scan) :*

- . XY stages for chip positioning
- . One position – several laser pulses
- . Pass-fail from data returned by the device
- . One scan per timing of interest

=> Different effects

## Context – Attacks summary




## Semi-invasive attacks – Tests

*Targeted shot :*

- . Precise localization from laser scan image
- . Timing still critical

## Context – Attacks summary







## Invasive attacks

Get access to the circuitry itself and apply modification for

- Shield bypass
- Embedded counter-measures deactivation
- Data extraction

## Context – Attacks summary




## Invasive attacks

*The process : delayering and imaging*

- Delayering requires skills and machinery
- Optical and / or SEM scan
- Pictures stitching is key
- Alignment of layers must be precise

## Context – Attacks summary





## Invasive attacks

*The process : optical imaging*

Optical scans are fast to perform but :

- Good tilt setup for high resolution scan is a nightmare (narrow depth of field)
- Small features become invisible with technology size reduction
- Oxide layers are light transparent (every deeper layer is visible)
- Pictures lack information such as vias

## Context – Imaging techniques




## Invasive attacks

*The process : SEM imaging*

SEM scan are slow (hours range) and pictures are distorted but :

- Depth of field is bigger
- Resolution is higher
- Oxide layers are not transparent (one visible layer at a time)

## Context – Imaging techniques







## Invasive attacks

The process : “Reverse-engineering”








- Intensive use of pictures
- Generate a test procedure
- Localize points of interests

## Context – Attacks summary



## Invasive attacks

*The process : Fib edit*




## Context – Attacks summary



## Invasive attacks

*The process : Micro-probing*

## Context – Attacks summary



## Invasive attacks

## Context – Attacks summary

### *Linear Code Extraction*

- 2 major types of instructions : sequential / jumps
  - Provide only one instruction to the core of sequential type
  - Core will execute something useless
  - Address will be incremented
  - The entire code will be outputted from NVM memory
- => Most successful invasive attack




## Invasive attacks

### *Linear Code Extraction*

- Cut and setup an instruction for the core (ex. nop)
- Read data before the cut

## Context – Attacks summary




## Invasive attacks

## Context – Attacks summary

*Linear Code Extraction : Less FIBing – more options*

- Use buffer or register / latch signal to prevent read buffer output update
  - Read data before the buffer (register / latch)
- ⇒ Running code extraction is straight forward
- ⇒ Modification of the code is possible
- ⇒ Skipping instruction is possible (jumps...)





## Context – Chip classification

3 different kind of security levels :

- **Weak** : code can be extracted by old techniques or LCE
- **Adequate** : old techniques do not work // LCE can be done at the costs of Hardware Reverse-engineering
- **Advanced** : Hardware Reverse-engineering is mandatory for a code extraction + hardware functions have to be found and studied

## Context – Chip classification

3 different kind of security levels :

Chip manufacturer	Pirates	Customer	
Weak	Trivial	Dangerous cheap	No way
Adequate	Tricky	Balanced	Dangerous cheap
Advanced	Headache provider	Overkill expensive	Mandatory expensive



## *Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools the next step*

HRTs as the  
next step

HRT outcomes

Future  
developments

## HRTs as the next step

### Analysis techniques evolution :

- Laser fault injection
- ROM code extraction
- LCE
- Other techniques

### Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

- Sample preparation
- SEM imaging
- Accurate correlation
- All chip features become visible and usable



## Analysis techniques evolution :

## HRTs as the next step

### *Laser fault injection*

Usual tests target registers or memory output

- Where are the working registers?
  - Is the memory encrypted?
- ⇒ Results can be achieved but hardly exploited

Fishing tests are also effective



- Needed equipment price can be quite low
  - Effect can not be predicted
  - Timing and spot localization have to be found
- ⇒ Results can be achieved but can't be fully understood therefore exploits are difficult to build
- ⇒ Fishing is a real threat

## Analysis techniques evolution :

### *Laser fault injection : examples*

- Reading extra bytes from RAM while glitching during the ATR routine
  - Number of extra bytes depends on glitch location
  - Change mode of execution
  - Effect is “stored”
  - Original mode can be restored
  - Instruction skip
- ⇒ Registers can be found by fishing
- ⇒ Fault injected inside the core – what happened?

## HRTs as the next step






## Analysis techniques evolution :

### *LCE evolution*

- Principle does not change
- Memory encryption
- Multiplexers mixed with the core

## HRTs as the next step





## Analysis techniques evolution :

*LCE evolution : hidden mux*

8 bits processor

32 bits FLASH output going to the core

## HRTs as the next step






## Analysis techniques evolution :

*LCE evolution : hidden mux*

Lines have to be traced inside the core to find the 8 bits data bus.

## HRTs as the next step





## Analysis techniques evolution :

*LCE evolution : hidden mux*

- 3 paths can be followed :
- 2 of them can not be exploited

## HRTs as the next step






## Analysis techniques evolution :

## HRTs as the next step

### *LCE evolution : hidden mux*

- Finding the correct spot took some time
- Multiplexers were hidden
- Data was not encrypted



## Analysis techniques evolution :

*LCE evolution : state of the art*

- Multiplexers are hidden
- NVM content is scrambled
- NVM content is encrypted
- Hardware custom functions are implemented as part of the core
- Several thousands gates have to be reversed

*HRTs as the next step*









# Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

*ROM reading : ROM "optical reading"*

HRTs as the next step




## Analysis techniques evolution :

### *ROM reading : principle*

- Define 4 corners for alignment
- Affine transformation to compensate “tilt deformation”
- Define horizontal bit spacing
- Define vertical bit spacing
- Choose criteria for bit value
- Extract defined zone

## HRTs as the next step






Analysis techniques evolution :

*ROM reading : correlation issue*

HRTs as the next step

As ROMs are getting bigger, correlation errors have to be considered



4700 pictures have to be stitched




## Analysis techniques evolution :

*ROM reading : correlation issue*

Smarter procedure :

- Do not try correlating pictures (especially SEM pics) of a large scan
- Do not try to tell your script where the bits are
- Find bits corresponding to a noticeable value
- Extract a grid from their position
- From the grid, recover the missing bits
- Correlate bits from an image with those of the adjacent one and so on

## HRTs as the next step







Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

HRTs as the next step

*Deprocessing :*

By using plasma etching as the only technique for deprocessing, picture quality is poor





## Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

## HRTs as the next step

### *Deprocessing :*

Using combination of techniques such as Plasma etching, Chemical Mechanical Polishing and wet chemical etching leads to “perfect” deprocessing, suitable for SEM scan.







## Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

## HRTs as the next step

### *Deprocessing :*

- One layer visible at a time
- Vias also visible
- Custom process to distinguish vias and lines has been defined





Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

HRTs as the next step

*SEM imaging :*

Major issue was found and solved : SEM picture distortion

- Tilt adjustment table has been machined
- Fast scan
- Distortion is calculated for a given scan and reversed






Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

HRTs as the next step


*Features on grid :*



Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

HRTs as the next step

*Find vias :*






Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

HRTs as the next step

*Find lines :*







## Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

## HRTs as the next step

### *Accurate correlation*

- Correlation is performed on feature coordinates “grid pattern”
- At worst, lines are “jittering” around the calculated grid position






Sample preparation and imaging evolution :  
*Accurate correlation*

HRTs as the next step



Sample preparation and imaging evolution :  
*2 layers example:*

HRTs as the next step






## Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

## HRTs as the next step

*All information available*

- Vias and lines are extracted on a grid
- Gates are detected from the same mechanics
- No correlation error
- Layers are aligned “perfectly” without further picture transformation
- No more pixels – polygons only  
😊





## *Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools outcomes*

HRT outcomes

Future  
developments



## New possibilities :

## HRTs' outcomes

### *Some possible studies*

- semi-invasive preparation
- LCE preparation
- Shield global bypass
- Other embedded counter-measures bypass

New possibilities :

*Other techniques*

- Photoemission
- EMA
- Dynamic voltage contrast

HRTs as the next step




## New possibilities :

### *New tools*

FIB navigation files can be generated

- Planarised chip
- Backside edit

## HRTs' outcomes



## New threats :

### *Laser fault injection :*

Particular gates can be highlighted without any further study


- Fire at the located registers and see the effects

Tracing signals is easy as a click

- Fire first, with for example a pass-fail scan
- Look at what you hit at “fail” location
- Understand the effect

=> From laser glitching to laser fault injection.

## HRTs' outcomes






New threats :

*Laser fault injection become cheaper*

Context – Attacks summary




## New threats :

## HRTs' outcomes

### *Scan chains analysis :*

- Path chain are very easy to spot
- Used to debug / program the device





## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

### *Real world example :*

- ROM chip
  - ROM is scrambled
  - Multiplexers are hidden inside the logic
  - ROM is encrypted
  - Data encryption based on address and hard-wired key
- > Clear data bus location ?
- > Custom encryption reverse ?

## Timing consideration :

*Image preparation : "manual process"*

Correlation is based on pixel value :

- From 10 minutes to several hours
- Errors are inevitable

Image stitching is not reliable

- One picture = one photoshop layer
- Local adjustments are performed when needed

Alignment of 2 layers almost unfeasible but fast

- Local adjustments are performed when needed

## HRTs' outcomes







## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

*Finding data bus : "manual process"*

- Tons of layers are used and moved for local adjustment : Errors
- A schematic must be drawn to avoid being lost : Errors + you will get lost anyway



## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

*Finding data bus : "manual process"*

- Each found gate must be analyzed even if already studied : Errors + stay patient
- Equations have to be written in "mathematical form" : Many errors

$$\text{cell\_3\_12} = (\text{cell\_9\_24} \text{ xor } \text{cell\_9\_18}) \text{ xor } \text{cell\_1\_18}$$

$$\text{cell\_3\_13} = (\text{cell\_9\_20} \text{ xor } \text{cell\_9\_19}) \text{ xor } \text{cell\_1\_23}$$

$$\text{cell\_3\_13bis} = (\text{cell\_3\_14} \text{ xor } \text{cell\_9\_25}) \text{ xor } \text{cell\_5\_2}$$

$$\text{cell\_3\_14} = (\text{cell\_8\_4} \text{ xor } \text{cell\_g\_1}) \text{ xor } \text{cell\_6\_7}$$

$$\text{cell\_3\_15} = (\text{cell\_alpha\_1} \text{ xor } \text{cell\_9\_40}) \text{ xor } \text{cell\_13\_6}$$

$$\text{cell\_3\_16} = (\text{cell\_a\_1} \text{ xor } \text{cell\_1\_19}) \text{ xor } \text{cell\_13\_3}$$

$$\text{cell\_3\_17} = (\text{cell\_9\_21} \text{ xor } \text{cell\_9\_22}) \text{ xor } \text{cell\_1\_24}$$



## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

*Finding data bus : "manual process"*

-> Finally, with help of vhdl software (for example), schematic can be rearranged to understand the functions.

- Localization of the clear data bus is possible
- LCE is working

-> My FIB is down but I have reverse-engineered every single gate, I can read the ROM...


- VHDL simulations will show... that there are errors ☹️
- Localizing the errors can partially be made from simulations
- Where are the last errors?

## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

### *Deprocessing*

- Deprocessing for hardware reverse-engineering takes extra steps
- This process is not suited for optical imaging
- Complete deprocess can be achieved in about a week





## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

### *Image preparation : with HRT*



- Select area of interest and selection of rejected features(10 minutes per layer)
- Find vias (> 100 images per minutes)
- Find grid and lines (< 1 hour per layer)
- Extract gates (1 hour)
- Correct one layer : (1 day)
- Correlate and transform pictures + generates layer netlist (< 1 hour)
- Align 2 layers together (2 minutes)

## Timing consideration :

### *Reverse-engineering custom logic : with HRT*

- One layer per layer
  - No stitching problem
  - No local layer adjustment
- One click to follow net(s)
- Equations are generated automatically as well as schematic
  - No re-writing errors, software is highlighting what is missing

## HRTs' outcomes





## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

### *Timing :*



- After 2-3 weeks, every features are detected with good HRT
- 2 weeks later (average), LCE can be started
- Same work with « manual process » would take months

## Timing consideration :

## HRTs' outcomes

*Timing difference : reversing custom logic*

- 6 months after start of the study, results are still not exploitable
- With first generation of HRT, same study was performed in 2 months
- With next generation of the tool, time will be reduced to 1 month
  - \* With classical method, you would not have found the correct spots for LCE at this stage





New threats : Possible “achievements” :

HRTs’ outcomes

- 100 % success rate for hackers (excluding customized chip)
  - 6 to 12 microcontrollers a year (first extraction)
  - XX customized chip a year
- ⇒ The advanced security level becomes at best adequate  
Custom hardware functions become a new kind of ROM that could be extracted from pictures only
- ⇒ Piracy
- ⇒ Counterfeiting
- ⇒ Patent violation

## New opportunities :

## HRTs' outcomes

Better security level : in depth security evaluation with new techniques

Design and routing new strategies to make invasive work more complicated

Anti-piracy by changing the nature of the hardware custom functions


Affordable patent violation studies

Counterfeiting characterization

ICs' obsolescence



*Future developments*





## Future developments

- Schematic creation and interaction
- From gates to functions : automatic gates grouping to reduce number of blocs to study
- Fast detection of « non aligned » features : from core to chip
- Simulator, specific analysis
- ...



# Texplained

Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools  
new threats – new opportunities

Q&A...

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